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Introduction 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan 
 
 
 
  
 Is law possible?  Is there something called “law” that is authoritative for us?  These 
questions may seem otiose, and perhaps they should seem so.  After all, Congress and state 
legislatures keep enacting statutes, federal and state courts continue to decide cases, and 
judgments are enforced in the name of the law every working day of the year (and sometimes on 
holidays and weekends).   
For all that, we can ask whether law remains possible.  We can inquire, in other words, 
whether such artifacts and outputs, undertakings and activities, and others like them, taken 
individually or collectively, deliver law.  Or do they amount, in the end, to something 
categorically different, something only authoritarian and reducible to force?   
It would be extravagant to suppose that humans have never made law.  It would be 
unwise, however, to take for granted that what was once possible remains so.  The authority with 
which earlier societies were shot through is no longer possible in the modern world, or so 
Hannah Arendt argued, and many have taken her startling claim seriously indeed.  And privacy, 
to take another example, is disappearing before our (covered) eyes.    
Without extravagance, therefore, we can ask whether it could be so with law.  Could it be 
that pretenders to law remain, while the real thing is slipping unnoticed away into impossibility 
or dormancy?    
Is law possible?   
As a universal matter, a fact proves a possibility, and law is no exception to the universal.  
Our question, then, can be restated as follows: Is law a fact?  Or, as is so often supposed today, is 
“law” just the deceptive mask of power politics, or perhaps just an occasion for the technical 
expertise of others forms – more “scientific” forms -- of social thought? 
 Over a period of four decades, in season and out, Joseph Vining has testified to the 
possibility of law not by describing – for it is difficult to describe law without destroying that 
which is most important in it -- but by showing us the fact of law in the modern world.  Vining 
has approached his task from oblique angles.  Unlike legal philosophers in the tradition of John 
Austin, Vining does not assert a formal definition of law, and then ignore what does not fit 
within the narrow confines of the definition.  In showing that law is, Vining shows what law is – 
and the what of law is not what is often asserted or supposed.  Law is not, for example, any one 
artifact or some assemblage of the same (such as statutes and decided cases) that lawyers and 
others use in saying what the law is. The law, for Vining, is always more than the sum of its 
parts.  
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In his effort to show us the fact of law, Vining leaves nothing out.  This is because law, as 
Vining reveals, leaves nothing out, or at least as little as possible.  Vining attends, rather, to all 
that people do and do not do in the name of the law: every verbal parry and thrust, every claim 
and equivocation, every word and every silence – all of them so many manifestations of the 
human mind functioning in a unique and irreducible way.  Vining, working by way of (what he 
describes as a) “distillation of vacillations,”1 marshals all manner of evidence that law does not  
just lie there on the page, does not just get asserted or threatened, and speaks to us only through 
our conversations about it.  “Law connects language to person, and person to action, though a 
form of thought that is not reducible to any other.”2  Law is what is produced by “the legal 
mind.”3  
A stranger to contemporary American law might think these platitudes, but in fact, the 
very ideas of the legal mind, and of law itself as a mode of thought and practice capacious 
enough to accommodate and interpret human experience, are under seige.  Vining has written at 
length and persuasively against the prevalence in contemporary thought of “total theories” that in 
his view pursue their totalizing ambitions by harsh reductionisms that exclude from view much 
of what makes us human.  In academic discussion about law, this ambition regularly takes the 
form of the claim to see through or past the law itself to the “real” economic or sociological or 
political forces that control human society.  For Vining, as for the other authors represented in 
this book, such claims are assertions of will rather than statements of necessity, and the 
continuing existence of the law, which deals with society and the human by interpreting them 
rather than by denying their full meaning, is an implicit disproof of the theorists’ hubris. 
In view of what may at first sound like a rather rarified or romanticized account of law, 
one may wonder if Vining concedes, or at least worries, that law, like authority before it and 
privacy today, is becoming outdated.  Vining anticipates the question, with this answer:  “The 
legal form of thought is not waning – rather the reverse.”4  For Vining this is cause for hope.  So 
it is for the editors and the other authors we represent in this book.  This is because, as Vining 
discloses, law is evidence not of threat, not of assertion, not of intimidation but, instead, of the 
“caring mind” at work on behalf of the community and of all the individuals who comprise it.  
“Law,” as Vining sees it, “is evidence of view and belief far stronger than academic statement or 
introspection can provide.”5  What is said about law by some academics can be cause for 
despair; Vining illustrates that what is done in the name of the law, at least much of the time, is 
cause for hope.  The “legal mind” struggles to leave nothing out.   
Nevertheless, as Vining also teaches, law needs its preservers: those who, like the authors 
of the chapters collected here, join him in seeking to prevent despair from becoming common 
sense in these complex and violent times when we ask so very much of law. Each chapter began 
as a talk (lectures would make them sound more scripted than most of them were) at a 
conference convened at Villanova University School of Law for the purpose of celebrating 
Vining’s oeuvre and encouraging exploration of its implications for the future.  Although the 
conference coincided with Vining’s retirement from the University of Michigan Law School, 
where he taught for forty years, this volume is by no means in the nature of a festschrift, at least 
to the extent that word would connote completion or ending.  Yes, the book is intended, as the 
conference itself was intended, to honor Vining, who has been an inspiration to all of the authors, 
but even more, the book is intended to raise up and to thematize, without oversimplifying or 
systematizing, the reasons for hope, both for ourselves and our cultures, that Vining has shared 
with us.  The book is intended to build on, and so to invite others to build on, the work Vining 
has begun so beautifully, and to reassure them in their hope as Vining has reassured us.      
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In retrospect, we see that the conference at Villanova instantiated and captured, for a day 
and we dare to hope more than a day, something that is happening and, we believe, should 
continue to happen throughout our American legal culture.  It is our shared sense that the drift -- 
sometimes verging on a march -- of much of that legal culture has been in the direction of force, 
frequently taking the form of argument or ipse dixit according to which words and texts in law 
amount to objects to be manipulated, rather than serve as the carriers of human meanings to be 
discovered.  The chapters that follow collect evidence of this phenomenon and those related to it.  
Over against this force-driven elimination of the personal from law, the contributors to this 
volume share the sense, nowhere more richly articulated than in the work of Vining, that law 
engages and serves whole persons, appealing to and thus honoring their freedom, and, in this, 
touches upon the divine as they do.  The Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan 
once asked, “Is everyone to use force against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside 
the point?”6  Vining and the other authors who join him here answer that law, at least as it should 
be, answers Lonergan’s question with a respectful but decisive “no.”        
It is our hope that this volume will serve its readers as something of an extension of what 
its authors shared together, on the occasion of the conference.  We believe that our experience 
then is by no means unique: when persons who are concerned with law as a practice that 
involves whole and free persons engage honestly and openly with one another, it becomes 
possible to ask the human questions with which we come, and believe we ought to come, to 
lawyers’ work.  In a society in which even the articulation of questions about the meaning of 
humanity and personhood is difficult, identifying modes in which they can be addressed is of 
interest to many others besides those who are schooled in law.  That there can be legal truths, as 
there are poetic truths, is not just a subject for lawyers.  As Vining puts it in the last sentence of 
his book, From Newton’s Sleep:  “[The legal form of thought] may yet move to take a place 
beside the forms of thought of other disciplines that are self-reflective, as something to be 
reckoned with, in its own terms, in coming to any general understanding of the working of the 
world.”7 . 
In the chapter that opens this book, “The Filaments of the Vicarious,” Vining recalls and 
weaves together into a narrative the cross-currents that led in turn to his four books and to his 
many other writings.  With particular poignancy, he recalls his early need to explore “as science 
could not, the problem (as I put it then) of connecting ‘one unique life with other unique lives,’ 
which was also the problem ‘the problem of there being more than one person in the world’.”  
Connectivity, though he does not use the word, is a theme that, the editors think, runs through 
and animates Vining’s work.  How are we separate individuals to work out and to build up the 
life-increasing connections of which we are capable and needful?  Vining’s answer:  By 
recognizing and honoring both the personhood that we share and the individuality that each of us 
embodies, even, and perhaps especially, in law, through the discovery or creation of affinities. 
Vining’s law school classmate and lifelong friend, John McCausland, long a lawyer but 
now also an Episcopal priest, next brings the largely implicit and unsystematic theology of 
Vining’s thought into focus.  McCausland does this through reflection on the theology of 
mystery developed by Karl Rahner, S.J., whom some regard as the preeminent Catholic 
theologian of the twentieth century.  In his chapter, “Finding a Footing: A Theological 
Perspective on Law and the Work of Joseph Vining,” McCausland suggests the underlying 
foundation of Vining’s legal thought – the footing on which Vining believes law is ultimately 
founded – is the mystery of grace.  This assertion may seem a startling one to make about a 
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distinguished legal scholar in the contemporary American law school world:  we can best put it 
in McCausland’s own words:  
 
If we follow Rahner’s thought here, I think we can say that the work of Joseph 
Vining has been an exercise in demonstrating the importance of recognizing 
Grace in the operation of the law.  That would be a shocking, even risible, 
statement in the secular legal academy today.  Joe knows the patronizing 
politeness with which, at best, the academic establishment can greet efforts to 
speak of Grace, even if one avoids using this term.  That is why much of Joe’s 
argument has had to be “through the back door,” a via negativa, showing the 
sterility and danger of proceeding to treat law as though something like Grace did 
not and could not exist. 
 
McCausland’s chapter reaches its climax as it draws on what he – and Vining – see as the 
graced-filled lessons of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, God in God’s relationality.  In this light, 
it is by recognizing, enabling, and enhancing the relations of human individual persons in 
community that law, as Vining sees, achieves its gracious and God-given purposes.  I should 
note that in McCausland’s essay, more than in other chapters of the book, we have retained the 
style of address and the references that bespeak one old friend understanding another.  They are a 
testimony to the way affinity works. 
Law’s work of relating is at the core of Judge John T. Noonan’s chapter, “Through 
Papers to Persons.”  Drawing on more than a quarter-century of work as a United States 
appellate judge, Noonan confirms that the legal order does not work by calculating forces or 
reactions but, as Vining teaches, by persons responding to persons, through processes and papers 
and the “sources of law.”  Judges do possess powers, including the power to coerce.  In the act of 
judgment at its best, however, “power is related to love.”  Acting in the name of and for the good 
of the community, the judge reaches a legal judgment that, unless it be overruled, creates the 
terms by which the particular parties are to be related to the community of which they and the 
judge himself or herself are a part. 
James Boyd White’s chapter, “The Creation of Authority in a Sermon by St. Augustine,” 
takes up the question of the nature of authority, the topic of Vining’s book The Authoritative and 
the Authoritarian.  White does so by turning to theology (which Vining has identified as law’s 
true sister discipline) and the way in which theological authority is created by St. Augustine in a 
sermon.  Like the judge or lawyer carefully drawing on the “sources of law” to which Noonan 
referred, the Christian preacher creates authority for his message by embodying in his own 
performance the way in which the “Word is driven by love” for the persons to whom it is 
spoken.  The preacher with authority, Augustine, does not wield sharp-edged words of Scripture 
as tools with which to bludgeon his congregation; instead, the authoritative preacher of the 
Word, like the judge or lawyer, develops his or her authority, and avoids the authoritarian, by 
embodying “the relation each should have with the external authorities” that can be invoked.        
One aspect of Vining’s demonstrating the fact of law is a showing that law is not this or 
that legal artifact or output, nor even the ensemble of them.  As Jack Sammons explains in his 
chapter, “Law as Melody,” law is not something “external.”  But is it, then, something (merely) 
“internal”?  Sammons uses the analogy of music to suggest that, like music, law is neither 
external/physical nor internal/psychic, though we cannot describe either law or music without 
using these or similar categories.  Just as “[n]othing in the physical event corresponds to the tone 
  
 6
as a musical event,” so nothing in the world external to law corresponds to the law as a legal 
event.  Law, like music, is in part a non-conceptual way of liberating things so that they can 
reveal themselves to us.  Developing an aesthetic of law, Sammons concludes that the 
relationship of the lawyer or judge to what he is producing must be the same as that of the good 
musician to his or her music: justice, the virtue of taking things as they are.  Sammons, like 
Vining, warns against any aspiration to put an end to music’s capacity or law’s to reveal the 
world and that part of it that is our very selves. 
In his essay on “The Humanity of Law,” Jeff Powell begins by considering an old 
assertion that the great contracts teacher, Arther Allen Leff, was a nihilist about the law, and that 
his final, tragically uncompleted project, a dictionary of law was proof of his nihilism.  In actual 
fact, Powell argues, Leff like Vining understood the law as a practice demanding the very 
qualities of thought and responsible judgment human life calls for in general.  “Commitment, 
argument, the presuppositions of mind and person, the meaningfulness of language both uttered 
and received:  legal work, good legal work demands all of this.”  A practice so completely 
grounded in the commitment to good faith in human relationship is the opposite, not the 
exemplar, of nihilism, and Leff’s dictionary was one lawyer’s means of tending to the common 
task of keeping the language in which lawyers relate living and meaningful. 
Also inquiring into what we might call law’s ontology, Steven Smith, in his chapter, 
“Persons All the Way Up,” takes as his point of departure the question whether law is an 
objective phenomenon or a subjective one.  Situating this choice (law as objective vs. law as 
subjective) within the history of Western philosophy, Smith suggests that “perhaps the central 
purpose” of Vining’s work has been to resist the reduction of law to the world measured (or 
measurable) by science.  Smith argues that Vining’s work has been a defense of “personalism in 
a thoroughly personalist way,” a focus on the “actual qualities of persons.”  Among those 
qualities is faith – faith that others are there, are meaningful, and are capable of knowing and 
sharing meaning and value.  Smith concludes by suggesting that all of this faith depends, if it is 
not mere deception, on there being a Person whose universe is “more than mindless articles in 
pointless motion.” 
But if for Vining it is thus “persons all the way up,” is it also law all the way up?  This is 
the theme of Brennan’s chapter, “Are Legislation and Rules a Problem in Law?”, which asks 
whether Vining has given a legal, or a non-legal, account of how humans succeed in making law 
for their communities.  In other words, is Vining’s personalism of a piece with the bulk of that 
modern thought that postulates a God who creates but does not rule through law?  Or does it 
offer a counter-cultural claim that the human practice of law-making is itself governed by a law 
that bears a divine pedigree and yet respects human freedom?  Brennan suggests that legislation, 
which is for Vining a problem in human law, provides the pattern of all law, inasmuch as 
humans make law, rather than something less, by freely obeying the divine ordinance to “do and 
pursue the good and avoid evil.”  Vining’s understanding of the “legal mind” takes on new 
significance when the human mind is understood not just as the generator of law, but first as the 
recipient of a higher law according to which human goods are legally commanded.   
If this Introduction has succeeded in showing something of the affinities among the 
minds that have contributed to this book about our vision of law, we may also hope that it has 
also succeeded in suggesting the ways in which law itself is an affinitive undertaking.  In 
chemistry, “affinity” refers to the capacity of chemical substances to form compounds.  In 
biology, “affinity” refers to the phylogenetic relationship between two organisms or groups 
resulting in a resemblance in general structure.   In the context of marriage, “affinity” refers to 
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relational ties other than those of blood.  In the context of law, by contrast, “affinity” refers to the 
connections, which are neither chemical nor biological nor consanguineous, by which persons 
are freely connected to other persons as valued.  To the extent law succeeds in its affinitive 
aspirations, it leaves nothing out, and in this way resembles theology, as Vining has seen: 
 
Theology may not be law any more than any metaphor is the same as that which it 
reflects.  But it has the perhaps unique advantage that, like law, it leaves nothing 
out, not person, nor present, nor freedom, nor will, nor madness, nor individual, 
nor the delight of a child, nor the eyes of a fellow human being, nor our sense of 
the ultimate, in its effort to make sense of our experience and make statements 
that are consistent and understandable in light of it all.8 
 
The authors of this volume whom the editors represent write in the spirit Vining exemplifies, that 
of leaving nothing out.  This is not the direction of much jurisprudence today, and Vining has 
shown why jurisprudence stands to learn from law and its affinities.  The fact of law that leaves 
nothing out proves the possibility.  
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